This is a fine review. In his earnest ancestor worship, and longing for a heroic cause equal to the World Wars of our worthy progenitors, Beinart outlandishly exaggerates the threat of Islamist extremism.



But this passage from the review puzzled me a bit:



"But that doesn’t bother Beinart, because for him "salafist totalitarianism" is what the Cold War liberal Walt W. Rostow called communism–"a disease of the transition to modernization." He ignores the explanation provided by French scholar Olivier Roy, who has argued that jihadism is not a result of poverty or repression in the Muslim world, but rather of an identity crisis on the part of elite Muslims like Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atta, who have been exposed to Western modernity."



I don't see how Roy's account is in conflict with the neo-Rostowian account. To say that Salafism or other forms of Islamism are diseases of the transition to modernity does not commit one to the view that the underlying cause of the disease is economic or political repression. The "disease", if that's what it is, might very well be a reactionary urge toward cultural retrenchment, mainly on the part of the educated, in response to the sometimes humiliating social and cultural displacement wrought by modernity on the scions of a modernizing culture.



It is their very exposure to Western modernity, one might argue, that has radicalized these reactionary Islamists. Muhammad Atta, for example, wrote a thesis on the conflict between Western modernity and Arab civilization as seen in the urban landscape of Aleppo.



The reference to Pape seems more to the point. The rhetoric of much contemporary Islamism borrows heavily from the anti-imperialist thought of the present century as from earlier Islamic thinking. And however important might be the generalized reaction to Western modernity, the Islamists are often motivated by concrete, and sometimes localized, political goals - to expel some actual foreign presence from a community of interest.



All this said, it is dangerous to view events in other lands as crises in the "transition" to, or "on the road" to some milestone drawn from European/Western history. No one can confidently predict what peculiar combinations of innovation and tradition will characterize the Middle East of the future; nor are we wise enough to prescribe what form they should take.

Haven't read the book, but am a fan of Niebuhr, and I think adding this:



"jihadism is not a result of poverty or repression in the Muslim world, but rather of an identity crisis on the part of elite Muslims like Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atta, who have been exposed to Western modernity."



leads us into Eric Hoffer territory, specifically "The true Believer" in which self-esteem failure leads to fixation on ideals.



If fairly described, Beinart's thesis of Marshall plan sharing might work, but my personal observations of the clutch of corporations on the liberal genitalia will be too for more than a tease, worse than a affront.



We are financially so overcommitted to the coddling of the rich than there is likely nothing to do but enjoy another recession and hope for an FDR.

Indeed, Dan. But do you think Beinart exaggerates the threat in order to impel us to greatness? Or could it be that his perception of the threat is earnestly as vivid and grotesque as he paints it?



Can we level with ourselves? Is it really such a mystery that Beinart and the cabal in power would have the same paranoid policy orientation? Again it's David Brooks who said it (and then retracted it) first: "neo-" is short for "Jewish," and that's true whether it's followed by "-con" or sandwiched between "The" and "Republic." The remark was incendiary because it made sense. I'd like us to stop being offended for a moment and take a hard look at the preoccupations of these "hard-line" Democrats.



Those imagining forces such as "salafist totalitarians," "islamofascists," or simply "the enemy," are doing so to legitimize a fear of Muslims. Of course there are people out there who mean to do us harm. But the leap from dismantling jihadist networks to knocking over whole societies is an expression of deep-seated mistrust and antipathy. (The requisite acknowledgment of the existence of "moderate" Muslims only serves to underline this distrust.)



And it's that " 'Jewish' " (I'll put it in double scare quotes) orientation that Beinart puts on display here. Viewing the Muslim world behind a veil of Rostow and Strauss (via Wolfowitz), he can't even see it, let alone conceive of it as myriad societies that might not cope readily with "regime change."



I know, this is just the kind of pre-9/11 thinking our party can ill afford. But I, for one, would propose to mold our national purpose around something grander and more noble than our anger and ignorance.

If the best that "World War liberalism" can come up with is the United Nations, I'm afraid there's not much hope for its future.



This "vision of a post-imperial, peaceful liberal international system banning aggressive war and united on the basis of international law and global commerce" is dependent on the good faith of the least among nations. It's dependent on the good faith of bad actors. It's dependent on the good faith of people who administer "policing" programs like Oil for Food. That dependence is the reason why the UN has failed in its mission so utterably. Mr. Lind's tongue must be firmly fixed in his cheek to suggest that the Security Council today functions as intended. For if that indeed was the intent, then the UN was doomed for failure from the beginning. Face it, there's only one nation with the muscle to effectively "police" a ban on "aggressive" war. And we all know who that is.



Does Michael Lind understand how deeply suspicious many rank and file members of his party are of his global view?

Beinart's book (which I have read) asks an important question of Democrats and Liberals. I found the subject matter interesting and informative, but he could have made the same point on virtually any topic. The question he answers is the affirmative is: Are Liberals defining themselves by their opposition to the right?



I'd like to believe he is wrong about that, but I fear he is right.



I'd like to see a critique of his book - anywhere - that satisfies me that the answer to that question is "No." In fact, virtually every critic makes Beinart's point for him over and over by focusing on what wrong with the decisions made by the right in Iraq, before and after the decision to invade.

Having participated in a week long Beinart smackdown at TPMCafe, I'll hold fire. However, of the various and sundry reviews, comments I've read (not about to buy the book) this by Andrew Bacevich, in the current issue of the Nation, is perhaps the most informative on Beinart's historical approach or better his a-historical method. The contrast with the Kinzer book is striking.





He doesn't like it either.



"The Good Fight began life as an essay that appeared in The New Republic when Beinart edited that magazine. According to press reports, he received a handsome $600,000 advance to expand his essay into a book. The result can only be called a major disappointment: The Good Fight is insipid, pretentious and poorly written. At points it verges on incoherence. As history, it is meretricious. As policy prescription, it is wrongheaded. Beinart has perpetrated his fraud twice over. "









The American Political Tradition

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060717/bacevich

Andrew J. Bacevich | American foreign policy is shaped by a myth of national righteousness. In two new books, Peter Beinart abuses history to suggest liberals embrace this myth, while Stephen Kinzer uses America's history of involvement in foreign coups to reveal why we cannot.

In his overzealous attempt to debunk the central thesis of “The Good Fight,” Michael Lind either misses or ignores a great deal of the subtlety in Peter Beinart’s admirable first book. Lind’s argument that Beinart has too narrow a view of the liberal tradition, and therefore finds himself in league with the neoconservatives, misses much of the force of Beinart’s assessment of the political landscape in relation to the liberal tradition.



While it is true that Beinart argues that the neoconservative creed was built upon the fundamentals of cold-war liberalism, he does not proceed to make a neoconservative case. Or at least not the parts of neoconservativism that most liberals and progressives deem repugnant. Yes, Beinart agrees in principle with some of the core philosophical tenets of neoconservativism, but his argument tries to show that many of these tenets sprout from an often-overlooked part of the liberal past. He agrees that America’s role in the world is to spread freedom and liberty, and endorses a liberal idea of national greatness. This position, though neoconservative, is not in opposition to liberalism, and Beinart is careful in making this case. Where Beinart stops agreeing with the neoconservatives, and what he adamantly argues against (in this book if not in his articles circa 2003), is the use of hard power to spread freedom and liberty. This, he argues is where the cold-war liberalism of Niehbur and Schlessinger splits with the neoconservativism of Kristol and Podhoretz.



Lind faults Beinart almost immediately fro crossing the line and agreeing with anything that smack of neoconservativism. Indeed, his argument against Beinart’s diagnosis is that we are currently in the midst of a mire brought on by neoconservative logic, and therefore any system that subscribes to any part of neoconservative thought is wrong. But Lind should know that the failure of policy does not necessarily negate the philosophical principles underlying it.



Lastly, Lind would do well to know when Beinart is agreeing with him. He quotes Beinart’s use of the term “World War IV” in order to show that he subscribes so strongly to the neoconservative interpretation of history that he has adopted their terminology. But Beinart uses the term in a chapter entitled “Reagan’s Children” and he is using it to show the gaps and inconsistencies between neoconservative speech and action.



Beinart’s book deserves a serious read. He should not be discounted so quickly simply because he gives neoconservativism a serious read. Lind would do well to reread the book with an open mind.