How then to reshape the politics–and power relationships–of the global economy? A social contract did not come to an expanded American economy until American workers became conscious of their common interests. Similarly, one will come to the global economy only when working families see that in a global labor market, they have more in common with working families in other countries than they do with those on the other side of the bargaining table. Yet in a world of 6.5 billion people in almost 200 separate countries–representing wide differences in culture, living standards, and political consciousness–the prospect of seeing, to use an old phrase, "workers of the world unite" enough to humanize the relentlessly interconnecting markets seems hopelessly utopian. But if we begin to think of establishing a global social contract as a step-by-step process, in which political solidarity is built first among neighboring societies, region by region, rather than some grand, all-embracing design, there may yet be light at the end of this dark global tunnel.

Unlike global elites, who have easy access to global culture but little connection to their hometowns, ordinary citizens in countries in the same region tend to have more in common with one another than they do with people half a world away. Culture and language are closer, and trading relations are usually the strongest and most sustainable. True, wars historically have been fought mostly among neighbors, but the European Union (EU) demonstrates that at least among the more advanced societies, the future need not necessarily be prisoner of such a past. Moreover, regional integration would seem to be a much more promising path toward the inevitable trial-and-error involved in building competent and accountable institutions to manage cross-border economic integration. American states were, and to some extent still are, "laboratories of democracy" for the national government. In the same way, the process of creating regional institutions that match expanding regional markets might well produce "laboratories" for the construction of a social contract that might eventually stretch to the range of the global economy.

For all its slowness and the pain of its "two steps forward, one step backward" process, the effort to build a "Social Europe" to match the expanded European market offers the best real-world example of the development of a politics around a cross-border social contract among historically splintered neighbors. The future shape of Europe is contested political terrain, and the conflicts between workers and bosses, regulators and deregulators, and Europeanists and nationalists reflect the inevitably messy way in which democracy is addressing this historic experiment. The fragile democracies of the Mercosur countries in the southern cone of South America are beginning a similar project of economic integration that, if it continues, will inevitably involve some political integration as well. A germ of the same idea also lies in the economic collaboration among Southeast Asian nations.

This brings us back to the question of North America. Although NAFTA failed to deliver on its promises, it succeeded in integrating the three economies to the point of no return. Too many economic channels have been redirected north-south to reverse the course of economic integration. Every day, along with commingling labor markets, intracontinental connections in finance, marketing, and production are being hardwired for a seamless North American economy. We may not like NAFTA, but there is no reversing its course.

But that does not mean that it’s sacrosanct. Even those who designed NAFTA to accommodate their own interests understand that it is an inadequate instrument with which to govern this new political economy. Revising NAFTA is already a topic of conversation among North American business and political elites: The U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, the Mexican Council on Foreign Affairs, and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives have set up an ongoing "Task Force" to map out the next steps. Their 2005 report called for a commonly administered military security perimeter, common energy policies, and a modest investment fund for Mexico. And Mack McLarty, former Clinton chief of staff and now partner with Henry Kissinger in a consulting firm, has called for planning an oil-for-infrastructure deal with Mexico to be ready for the next U.S. president. But, while these and similar proposals contain some sensible ideas, the framework is the familiar one–an expanded market to feed global corporate ambitions–and gets us no closer to solving the catch-22 of unaccountable governance.

Instead, we need to transform NAFTA into a set of rules that recognizes the common economic future that now connects all of the people of the three nations. It would need to include, at a minimum, a "bill of rights" for citizens of North America, enforceable in all countries, that would reestablish rights for people at least as strong as the extraordinary privileges NAFTA gives to corporate investors. They would include guarantees of freedom of association and collective bargaining across borders, as well as an independent judiciary and public transparency in government dealings with the private sector. A new NAFTA would have to be a continental grand bargain in which Canada and the United States commit substantial long-term aid to Mexico in order to nurture higher and sustainable economic growth, while Mexico commits to policies (independent trade unions, minimum wages, equitable taxes, assistance to its depressed farm sector) that assure wages in all three nations rise with their productivity. To that end, it would require a North American customs union in which foreign trade would be managed in the service of the needs of all three countries for greater industrial self-sufficiency, resource conservation, and increased investment in health and education. Such a new vision for NAFTA would more strongly unite the three nations in a single competitive bloc that provides all of the citizens of North America, not just its corporate interests, an investment in its success.

North America is, of course, not Europe. It is easy to make the case that the political and economic conditions that motivated and nurtured the EU are quite unique. But at its conception, it was also easy to argue that the EU would be still born. Indeed, in at least some dimensions, a unified North American economy is a more credible idea. There are only three languages (counting Quebecois French) to deal with. All are relatively new countries. For at least two centuries people have been moving, marrying, and interconnecting culturally. The one time the United States and Canada fought was in the War of 1812, while the Mexican-American War ended in 1848.

When the twenty-first century began, polls showed Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans possessed highly favorable opinions of one another. Asked in a 2000 World Values Survey poll if they would be willing to form a new single country if it meant having a higher quality of life, majorities in each country said yes. In the aftermath of September 11, Canadians and Mexicans expressed massive solidarity with Americans (although the invasion of Iraq, which they overwhelmingly opposed, has rekindled some latent anti-Americanism). Many on the U.S. side, when they still supported the war, resented that Mexico and Canada refused to send troops. Still, the sense that–like it or not–the three societies share a common future comes through in a report of polls taken between 2003 and 2005, which shows support for North American economic integration in all three nations, even though people in each thought that NAFTA had been a "loser" for their country.

Moreover, gathering economic forces might actually force an acceleration toward integration. At some point, the unsustainable rise in the U.S. trade deficit will have to be reversed, threatening the economies of Canada and Mexico, whose growth since NAFTA has depended on the U.S. market. In order to avoid the political consequences (e.g., more illegal immigration from Mexico, less cooperation on national security from Canada), the United States may well be forced to establish a North American trading bloc anyway that protects its neighbors’ access to a U.S. economy that will be forced to reduce its overall imports.

One thing is certain. The global economy will continue to undermine both democracy and economic security until we develop the institutions to support a social contract across borders. To do that, what better place to start than in our own continental backyard?